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Abstract
We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods between groups of agents using
the recently introduced relaxations of envy-freeness. We consider the existence of fair allocations
under different assumptions on the valuations of the agents. In particular, our results cover cases
of arbitrary monotonic, responsive, and additive valuations, while for the case of binary valuations
we fully characterize the cardinalities of two groups of agents for which a fair allocation can be
guaranteed with respect to both envy-freeness up to one good (EF1) and envy-freeness up to any
good (EFX). Moreover, we introduce a new model where the agents are not partitioned into groups
in advance, but instead the partition can be chosen in conjunction with the allocation of the goods. In
this model, we show that for agents with arbitrary monotonic valuations, there is always a partition
of the agents into two groups of any given sizes along with an EF1 allocation of the goods. We also
provide an extension of this result to any number of groups.
1 Introduction
Fairness is one of the primary desiderata in decision-making procedures involving multiple agents. For
instance, machine learning researchers have recently studied how to design classification systems that
do not discriminate based on sensitive attributes such as race or gender [Dwork et al., 2012]. Another
problem that is ubiquitous in every society is that of allocating resources among the members of the
society. The study of how the allocation can be done fairly, commonly known as fair division, has found
applications ranging from settling divorce disputes [Brams and Taylor, 1996] to sharing apartment rent
[Su, 1999; Gal et al., 2017].
The vast majority of the fair division literature has focused on allocating resources among individual
agents. However, in many practical situations the resources need to be allocated among groups of agents.
The agents in each group share the same set of resources, but may have different preferences over them.
For instance, the books allocated to a library can be enjoyed by all of its members, and it may be the
case that some members prefer detective novels while others would rather read science fiction. Another
example is the division of household goods between families; different members of a family may have
contrasting opinions on the television or the sofa in their apartment.
The group aspect of fair division was introduced independently by Segal-Halevi and Nitzan [2016]
and Manurangsi and Suksompong [2017]. Segal-Halevi and Nitzan investigated the allocation of divisi-
ble goods such as cake or land. In contrast, Manurangsi and Suksompong studied the group allocation of
indivisible goods like books and cars. Both of these works used the fairness notion of envy-freeness—an
agent is said to be envy-free if she finds her group’s share to be as least as good as the share of any other
group. While envy-freeness cannot be guaranteed even when allocating indivisible goods among indi-
viduals (consider two agents who quarrel over a single valuable good), Manurangsi and Suksompong
showed that if the agents’ utilities for the goods are drawn at random, an envy-free allocation exists
with high probability in the group setting as the number of agents and goods grows. Segal-Halevi and
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Suksompong [2018] then introduced the concept of democratic fairness, which aims to satisfy a certain
fraction of the agents in each group. Among other fairness notions, they considered envy-freeness up to
one good (EF1), which means that while some agent may envy another group under the given allocation,
the envy can be eliminated by removing a single good from the other group’s share. Segal-Halevi and
Suksompong showed that for two groups, there always exists an allocation that is EF1 for at least 1/2 of
the agents in each group, and the factor 1/2 cannot be improved. We refer to [Suksompong, 2018b] for
an overview of the group fair division literature.
While the aforementioned works provide different methods for extending individual fair division to
the group setting, in some situations it may be important that all agents receive a fairness guarantee with
certainty regardless of their valuations. Suksompong [2018a] showed the possibilities and limitations of
using the maximin share notion to guarantee every agent a fair share. In this work, we study the extent to
which the recently introduced relaxations of envy-freeness, most notably EF1 and another notion called
EFX, can be used for the same purpose. We show that while EF1 is surprisingly robust and can be
guaranteed in a number of group settings, this is not the case for EFX. In addition, we introduce a new
model in which the partition of the agents into groups is not fixed in advance, but instead can be chosen
in conjunction with the allocation of the goods. This model captures settings where agents (or a central
authority) can choose the group that they want to be part of, such as membership in a library or gym.
1.1 Our Results
With the exception of Section 5.2, we assume that the goods are allocated between two groups of agents.
While this may seem restrictive at first glance, we remark here that fair division between two individual
agents, which is much more restrictive, has received a significant amount of attention in the literature
(e.g., [Brams and Fishburn, 2000; Brams et al., 2012, 2014; Aziz, 2016; Kilgour and Vetschera, 2018]).
Indeed, as we will see, the setting of two groups is quite rich and already allows for many interesting,
non-trivial results.
In Section 3, we assume that the agents in the two predetermined groups have binary valuations, i.e.,
each agent either desires each good or not. We characterize the cardinalities of the groups for which an
EF1 or EFX allocation always exists. Additionally, we consider a stronger variant of EFX introduced by
Plaut and Roughgarden [2018], which we refer to as EFX0. We prove a very strong negative result for
the group fairness setting, implying that this fairness notion can only be guaranteed when both groups
are singletons.
Next, in Section 4, we consider more general classes of valuations. If one group is a singleton and
the other group consists of two agents, we show that a balanced EF1 allocation always exists provided
that the agents are endowed with responsive valuations, a general class that contains the well-studied
class of additive valuations. Balancedness means that the sizes of the two bundles differ by at most one.
Moreover, we establish a surprising connection between our group fair division problem and a class of
graphs known as generalized Kneser graphs. We show that if a conjecture by Jafari and Alipour [2017]
on the chromatic number of particular graphs from this class is true, it would imply that a balanced EF1
allocation exists whenever the two groups contain a total of at most five agents with arbitrary monotonic
valuations. This bound would be tight due to our results in Section 3.
Finally, in Section 5 we examine the newly introduced setting where we assume that the partition
of the agents into groups is no longer fixed and can be chosen along with the allocation of the goods.
Our results indicate that if a central authority or the agents themselves have the power to decide which
group to join, then fair allocations are much easier to achieve. In particular, we show that for two groups
of agents with arbitrary monotonic valuations, it is always possible to simultaneously obtain a balanced
partition of the agents and a balanced EF1 allocation of the goods. In addition, for any given sizes of the
two groups, there is a partition of the agents conforming to those sizes together with an EF1 allocation
of the goods. We also present an extension of this result to any number of groups.
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1.2 Further Related Work
The fairness notions EF1 and EFX were introduced by Lipton et al. [2004] and Caragiannis et al. [2016],
and studied in several papers over the last few years [Plaut and Roughgarden, 2018; Amanatidis et al.,
2018; Biswas and Barman, 2018; Bilo` et al., 2019; Oh et al., 2019]. For individual fair division, it is
known that an EF1 allocation is guaranteed to exist for any number of agents with monotonic valuations,
while the question remains open for EFX.
A recent paper by Ghodsi et al. [2018] addressed the problem of rent division for groups. In addition
to determining the allocation of the rooms, the rent of the apartment must be divided among the agents.
Like us, Ghodsi et al. also considered a model where the groups are not predetermined.
Another line of research has also considered group fairness in resource allocation but using a dif-
ferent kind of fairness notions than ours [Berliant et al., 1992; Husseinov, 2011; Todo et al., 2011;
Aleksandrov and Walsh, 2018; Conitzer et al., 2019]. In these papers, the resources are allocated to
individual agents, and the aim is to minimize the envy that arises between groups of these agents. In
contrast, in our work the resources are allocated to groups of agents and shared as public goods among
the agents within each group.
Recently, Biswas and Barman [2018] examined cardinality constraints in individual fair division,
where the goods are categorized and there is a limit on the number of goods from each category that can
be allocated to each agent. Our balancedness notion can be seen as a special case of these constraints.
2 Preliminaries
Let G = {g1, . . . , gm} denote the set of goods, and A the set of n agents. A bundle is a subset of G.
The agents are partitioned into k ≥ 2 groups. We assume in Sections 3 and 4 that this partition is fixed
in advance, and in Section 5 that the partition is variable and can be chosen. Denote by ni the size of
group i (so n =
∑k
i=1 ni), and aij the jth agent of group i. The agents in each group will be collectively
allocated a subset of G; denote by Bi the bundle allocated to group i so that Bi ∩Bj = ∅ for any i 6= j
and ∪ki=1Bi = G. A partition of the agents is called balanced if |ni − nj | ≤ 1 for any i, j. Similarly, an
allocation of the goods is called balanced if ||Bi| − |Bj || ≤ 1 for any i, j.
Each agent aij has some non-negative valuation uij(G′) for each set of goods G′ ⊆ G; for conve-
nience we write uij(g) instead of uij({g}) for a good g ∈ G. Let uij := (uij(g1), . . . , uij(gm)) be the
valuation vector of agent aij for individual goods. We assume that valuations are
• monotonic: u(G1) ≤ u(G2) for any G1 ⊆ G2 ⊆ G, and
• normalized: u(∅) = 0.
A valuation function u is said to be
• responsive if u(G′ ∪ {g}) ≥ u(G′ ∪ {g}) for any G′ ⊆ G and any goods g, g 6∈ G′ such that
u(g) ≥ u(g),
• additive if u(G′) =∑g∈G′ u(g) for any G′ ⊆ G, and
• binary if it is additive and u(g) ∈ {0, 1} for all g ∈ G.
Note that every additive valuation is responsive. Additive valuations are often assumed in recent fair
division literature [Caragiannis et al., 2016; Amanatidis et al., 2018; Biswas and Barman, 2018; Conitzer
et al., 2019]. An instance consists of agents, goods, and utility functions (and in the model of Sections 3
and 4, the partition of agents into groups). In Section 5, we simply denote the agents by a1, . . . , an and
their valuations by u1, . . . , un.
We are now ready to define the fairness notions that we consider in this paper.
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Definition 2.1. An allocation (B1, . . . , Bn) is said to be
• envy-free for agent aij if uij(Bi) ≥ uij(Bi′) for any i′;
• envy-free up to any good (EFX0) for agent aij if for any i′ and any good g ∈ Bi′ , we have
uij(Bi) ≥ uij(Bi′\{g});
• envy-free up to any positively valued good (EFX) for agent aij if for any i′ and any good g ∈ Bi′
such that uij(g) > 0, we have uij(Bi) ≥ uij(Bi′\{g});
• envy-free up to c goods (EFc) for agent aij , for a given positive integer c, if for any i′ there is a set
B ⊆ Bi′ with |B| ≤ c such that uij(Bi) ≥ uij(Bi′\B).
An allocation is said to be envy-free if it is envy-free for every agent. When there are two groups, we say
that an agent finds a bundle to be envy-free if the allocation that assigns the bundle to her group and the
complement bundle to the other group is envy-free for her. Analogous definitions hold for EFX0, EFX,
and EFc.
EFX0 is a variant of EFX introduced by Plaut and Roughgarden [2018].1 For additive valuations,
it is clear that each property in the list is stronger than the next, with EFX implying EF1. We will only
consider EFX and EFX0 in the context of additive valuations. In Sections 4 and 5 we only state results
for EFX, but all of these results also hold for EFX0.
3 Fixed Groups with Binary Valuations
In this section, we assume that the agents have binary valuations and are partitioned in advance into two
groups of size n1 and n2. Note that any non-existence result for (n1, n2) yields an analogous result for
(n′1, n′2) with n′1 ≥ n1 and n′2 ≥ n2, since in the latter case a subset of n1 agents from the first group
and a subset of n2 agents from the second group still need to consider the allocation fair. Similarly, an
existence result for (n1, n2) yields a corresponding result for (n′1, n′2) with n′1 ≤ n1 and n′2 ≤ n2.
We begin by considering the notions EFX and EF1. In fact, for binary valuations one can easily
verify that EFX and EF1 are equivalent, so it suffices to consider only EF1.
We first present two results that establish the existence of an EF1 allocation for the cases (n1, n2) =
(5, 1) and (3, 2). Before we present the proofs, we give a high-level overview of the arguments that we
use. First, observe that since the valuations are binary, each good can be described by the set of agents
who desire it. If two goods are desired by the same set of agents, we can allocate one to each group
and then search for an EF1 allocation of the reduced instance with the remaining goods. Hence we may
assume that every good is desired by a distinct subset of agents. This reduces the problem to a finite
(but still large) number of possible instances. We then perform other preprocessing steps to reduce the
number of cases even further. For example, if an agent desires an odd number of goods, the requirement
that EF1 imposes on the agent remains the same when we perturb the valuation of the agent so that she
no longer desires an arbitrary good. As a result, we may assume that every agent desires an even number
of goods.
Theorem 3.1. For (n1, n2) = (5, 1) and binary valuations, an EF1 allocation always exists.
Proof. For the sake of convenience, we slightly modify the notation used in this proof. Consider an
instance with two groups of agents A = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} and B = {b}. For a set of goods G′ ⊆ G, let
di(G
′) be the subset of goods in G′ that agent i desires. For binary valuations, each good g ∈ G can be
represented by the set of agents who desire it, i.e., we represent g by the set {i ∈ A ∪ B | g ∈ di(G)}.
First, we perform a number of preprocessing steps as follows.
1In their paper this property is simply called EFX; we rename it to avoid confusion with the original definition of Caragian-
nis et al. [2016], which we refer to as EFX.
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(P1) We allocate each good g 6∈ db(G) to group A; this reduces the problem to finding an EF1 alloca-
tion of the remaining goods. Hence, we may assume that db(G) = G, and simply represent each
good g as a subset of {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}.
(P2) If there are an odd number of goods, then we allocate an arbitrary good to group A; this again
reduces the problem to finding an EF1 allocation of the remaining goods. Hence, we may assume
that there are an even number of goods.
(P3) If there are two goods g and g such that g ⊆ g, then we allocate g to group A and g to agent
b. More generally, if there are two disjoint sets of goods G1 and G2 of equal size such that
|di(G1)| ≥ |di(G2)| for every agent i ∈ A, then we allocate G1 to group A and G2 to agent b.
Therefore, in the following, we may assume that every good is represented by a distinct set of
agents, and there is no subset-superset relations among the goods.
(P4) For any agent i ∈ A that desires an odd number of goods, we assume a modified valuation
function u˜i such that u˜i(g∗) = 0 for some g∗ that is desired by agent i according to ui, and
u˜i(g) = ui(g) for g 6= g∗. This again reduces the problem to finding an EF1 allocation for the
instance with modified valuation functions. After we perform this step, it may be possible to
perform the previous steps again. In such a case, we keep performing these steps until no longer
possible.
After the preprocessing, there are an even number of goods and every agent desires an even number
of goods. We claim that actually there are no goods left. Assume otherwise.
• If there is a good g of size 0 or 5, then no other good g′ can appear since g′ would either be a
superset or a subset of g, and step (P3) would have already allocated both g and g′. Therefore,
there is only one good, contradicting the assumption that the number of goods is even.
• If there is a singleton good g = {i} for some i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, then no other good g′ containing i
can appear, since otherwise g′ would be a superset of g. Therefore, agent i only desires one good,
contradicting the assumption that every agent desires an even number of goods.
• If there is a good g of size 4, say g = {1, 2, 3, 4}, then any other good g′ must contain 5, since
otherwise g′ would be a subset of g. Since there are an even number of goods, this means that
agent 5 desires an odd number of goods, again contradicting the assumption that all agents in A
desire an even number of goods.
Therefore, all goods correspond to subsets of size 2 or 3. Let k2 and k3 denote the number of goods
of size 2 and 3, respectively. Since all agents desire an even number of goods, k3 must be even, and
since there are an even number of goods, k2 must be even as well. It suffices to consider the case where
k2 ≥ k3. This is without loss of generality because if k2 < k3, we can replace each good g by its
complement A\g. In the new instance, there are still an even number of goods, every agent still desires
an even number of goods, and k2 ≥ k3. Moreover, if there is a preprocessing step that can be applied to
the new instance, a corresponding step can be applied to the original instance.
Recall that |A| = 5 and every subset is represented by at most one good, so k2 cannot exceed
the number of sets of size 2 from a universe of size 5, which is 10. Since k2 is even, k2 ≥ k3, and
k2 + k3 > 0, we have k2 ∈ {2, 4, 6, 8, 10}. We consider each of these cases in turn.
• Case 1: k2 = 10. This means that all goods of size 2 are present. If we set G1 = {{1, 2}, {3, 4}}
and G2 = {{1, 3}, {2, 4}}, then G1 and G2 should have already been allocated in step (P3), a
contradiction.
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• Case 2: k2 = 8. Consider the two goods of size 2 that are absent. If they share one el-
ement, we may assume without loss of generality that they are {3, 5} and {4, 5}; if they do
not share any element, we may assume that they are {2, 3} and {4, 5}. Either way, the goods
{1, 2}, {1, 3}, {2, 4}, {3, 4} are present. If we setG1 = {{1, 2}, {3, 4}} andG2 = {{1, 3}, {2, 4}},
then G1 and G2 should have already been allocated in step (P3), a contradiction.
• Case 3: k2 = 6. First, note that if k3 ≥ 2, then since we have already allocated all goods that
form subset-superset relations in step (P3), we must have k2 ≤ 5. Hence, k3 = 0. If at least
two of the agents desire four goods each, there must be at least seven goods in total, which is
not the case. Since every agent desires an even number of goods, the only possibility is that one
of the agents desires four goods and the remaining four agents two goods each. Assume without
loss of generality that the goods {1, 2}, {1, 3}, {1, 4}, {1, 5}, {2, 3}, {4, 5} are present. If we set
G1 = {{1, 2}, {1, 3}, {4, 5}} and G2 = {{1, 4}, {1, 5}, {2, 3}}, then G1 and G2 should have
already been allocated in step (P3), a contradiction.
• Case 4: k2 = 4. Consider the four goods of size 2 that are present. Since the corresponding sets
cannot be all disjoint, we may assume that two of them are {1, 2} and {1, 3}. The subsets of size
3 that can be present are {1, 4, 5}, {2, 3, 4}, {2, 3, 5}, {2, 4, 5}, {3, 4, 5}.
– Case 4.1: Of the remaining two sets of size 2, at least one set contains 1. Assume without
loss of generality that {1, 4} is present, so {1, 4, 5} cannot be present. Since agent 1 desires
an even number of goods, {1, 5} must be present. Using the constraint that each agent
desires an even number of goods, one can check that {2, 3, 4}, {2, 3, 5}, {2, 4, 5}, {3, 4, 5}
must all be present. However, sets G1 = {{1, 2}, {3, 4, 5}} and G2 = {{1, 3}, {2, 4, 5}}
should have been allocated in step (P3), a contradiction.
– Case 4.2: Of the remaining two sets of size 2, neither set contains 1. At least one of these
sets must contain 2 or 3. Since agent 1 desires an even number of goods, {1, 4, 5} cannot be
present. Suppose first that {2, 3} is present, so {2, 3, 4} and {2, 3, 5} cannot be present. One
can check that no matter whether {2, 4, 5}, {3, 4, 5} are both present or both absent, there
is no way to make every agent desire an even number of goods. So {2, 3} is not present.
Assume without loss of generality that {2, 4} is present, so {2, 3, 4} and {2, 4, 5} cannot be
present. If {2, 3, 5} and {3, 4, 5} are both absent, the fourth set of size 2 must be {3, 4},
and we may obtain a contradiction as in Case 2. Otherwise, {2, 3, 5} and {3, 4, 5} are both
present, and the fourth set of size 2 must be {2, 3}. But we have already deduced that {2, 3}
must be absent, a contradiction.
• Case 5: k2 = 2. Consider the two goods of size 2 that are present. Since these goods have to be
distinct and all agents desire an even number of goods, we cannot have k3 = 0, so k3 = 2.
– Case 5.1: These two goods share an agent. Assume without loss of generality that they are
{1, 2} and {1, 3}. Moreover, the two goods of size 3 cannot be a superset of {1, 2} or {1, 3}.
The only possibility is that they are {2, 4, 5} and {3, 4, 5}. If we setG1 = {{1, 2}, {3, 4, 5}}
and G2 = {{1, 3}, {2, 4, 5}}, then G1 and G2 should have already been allocated in step
(P3), a contradiction.
– Case 5.2: These two goods are disjoint. Assume without loss of generality that they are
{1, 2} and {3, 4}. Then the two goods of size 3 must be either {1, 3, 5} and {2, 4, 5}, or
{1, 4, 5} and {2, 3, 5}. In either case, we may set G1 to contain the two goods of size 3 and
G2 = {{1, 2}, {3, 4}} and obtain a contradiction as before.
All cases have been exhausted, and the proof is complete.
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Theorem 3.2. For (n1, n2) = (3, 2) and binary valuations, an EF1 allocation always exists.
Proof. For the sake of convenience, we slightly modify the notation used in this proof. Consider an
instance with two groups of agents A = {1, 2, 3} and B = {x, y}. We represent each good by the set of
agents who desire it. For convenience, we denote a good g as g = ST , where S ⊆ A and T ⊆ B are the
subsets of agents who desire g in A and B, respectively.
Similarly to the proof of Theorem 3.1, we can perform some preprocessing steps so that every good
is desired by at least one agent in each group (if g = ST is such that S = ∅ or T = ∅, then we can
simply allocate g to group B or group A, respectively), and every agent desires an even number of
goods (if this is not the case, we modify the valuation function of every such agent by making the agent
“undesire” an arbitrary good; this does not affect whether the agent considers an allocation to be EF1).
We further assume that each agent in B desires at least one good; otherwise the problem reduces to the
(n1, n2) = (3, 1) case, which is already covered by Theorem 3.1.
If two goods g1 = ST11 and g2 = S
T2
2 are such that S1 ⊇ S2 and T1 ⊆ T2, then we can allocate g1
to A and g2 to B. Since the agents in A that desire g2 also desire g1, and the agents in B that desire g1
also desire g2, this reduces the problem to computing an EF1 allocation for the remaining goods. In the
following we therefore assume that there do not exist two such goods; in particular, there is at most one
good of type ST for each S ⊆ {1, 2, 3} and T ⊆ {x, y}, and there are at most three goods of type ST
for each T ⊆ {x, y}. More generally, if there are two disjoint sets of goods G1 and G2 such that every
agent in A desires at least as many goods in G1 as in G2, while every agent in B desires at least as many
goods in G2 as in G1, we can allocate G1 to A and G2 to B. Consequently, we may assume that there
do not exist two such sets of goods.
We now show that all goods have been allocated by the above preprocessing steps. By the above
discussion, if the good {1, 2, 3}x is present, then no other good that agent x desires can be present, which
means that x desires an odd number of goods, a contradiction. Hence, goods {1, 2, 3}x and {1, 2, 3}y
are absent. Similarly, if the good {1}xy is present, then no other good that agent 1 desires can be present,
meaning that 1 desires an odd number of goods, again contradicting the assumption that all agents desire
an even number of goods. So, goods {1}xy, {2}xy, and {3}xy are absent. Therefore, the goods of type
Sxy that can be present are {1, 2}xy, {1, 3}xy, {2, 3}xy, and {1, 2, 3}xy. We consider some cases.
• Case 1: No good of type Sxy is present. Since every agent desires an even number of goods and
each agent in B desires at least one good, there are exactly two goods of type Sx and two goods
of type Sy. Let these goods be Sx1 , S
x
2 , T
y
1 and T
y
2 ; by the above preprocessing steps, there are no
subset-superset relations between (S1, S2) and (T1, T2).
– Case 1.1: |S1| = |S2| = 1. Without loss of generality, assume that S1 = {1} and S2 =
{2}. Since each agent desires an even number of goods, the other two goods are either
{1}y and {2}y, or {1, 3}y and {2, 3}y. In the first case we set G1 = {{1}x, {2}y} and
G2 = {{1}y, {2}x}, while in the second case we set G1 = {{1}x, {2, 3}y} and G2 =
{{1, 3}y, {2}x}. ThenG1 andG2 should have been allocated during the preprocessing steps
(since every agent desires the same number of goods in G1 as in G2), a contradiction.
– Case 1.2: |S1| = 1 and |S2| = 2. Without loss of generality, assume that S1 = {1}
and S2 = {2, 3}. Since every agent desires an even number of goods, the other two
goods can be ({1}y, {2, 3}y), ({2}y, {1, 3}y), or ({3}y, {1, 2}y). We set (G1, G2) to be
({{1}x, {2, 3}y}, {{2, 3}x, {1}y}) in the first case, ({{2, 3}x, {1, 3}y}, {{1}x, {2}y}) in the
second case, and ({{2, 3}x, {1, 2}y}, {{1}x, {3}y}) in the third case. Then, again, G1 and
G2 should have been allocated during the preprocessing steps, a contradiction.
– Case 1.3: |S1| = |S2| = 2. Without loss of generality, assume that S1 = {1, 2} and
S2 = {1, 3}. Since each agent desires an even number of goods, the other two goods are
either {2}y and {3}y, or {1, 2}y and {1, 3}y. Then, similarly to the cases above, we set
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G1 = {{1, 2}x, {3}y} and G2 = {{1, 3}x, {2}y} in the first case, while in the second case
we set G1 = {{1, 2}x, {1, 3}y} and G2 = {{1, 3}x, {1, 2}y}. Then G1 and G2 should have
been allocated during the preprocessing steps, a contradiction.
• Case 2: Good {1, 2, 3}xy is present. Then, by the preprocessing steps, goods {1, 2}xy, {1, 3}xy,
and {2, 3}xy must be absent. Since every agent desires an even number of goods, there is an odd
number (one or three) of goods of type Sx as well as an odd number of goods of type Sy.
– Case 2.1: There is one good of type Sx. Since each agent desires an even number of goods,
there is also exactly one good of type T y with S ∩ T = ∅ and S ∪ T = {1, 2, 3}. By setting
G1 = {Sx, T y} and G2 = {{1, 2, 3}xy}, G1 and G2 should have already been allocated
during the preprocessing steps, a contradiction.
– Case 2.2: There are three goods of type Sx. These must be either {1}x, {2}x, {3}x or
{1, 2}x, {1, 3}x, {2, 3}x. Suppose the former. Then, since every agent desires an even
number of goods, goods {1, 2}y, {1, 3}y, {2, 3}y must also be present. If we set G1 =
{{1}x, {2, 3}y} and G2 = {{1, 3}y, {2}x}, then G1 and G2 should have already been allo-
cated during the preprocessing steps, a contradiction. The case where {1, 2}x, {1, 3}x, {2, 3}x
are present can be handled analogously.
• Case 3: Good {1, 2, 3}xy is absent, and only one good of type Sxy with |S| = 2 is present.
Without loss of generality, assume that this good is {1, 2}xy. Then, by the preprocessing steps,
goods {1, 2}x and {1, 2}y must be absent. Since every agent desires an even number of goods,
there is an odd number (one or three) of goods of type Sx and an odd number of goods of type
Sy. If there are three goods of type Sx, these must be {1}x, {2}x, {3}x, but then, for every agent
to desire an even number of goods, it has to be that the only additional good is {3}y. In this case,
however, if we set G1 = {{1, 2}xy, {3}x} and G2 = {{1}x, {2}x, {3}y}, then G1 and G2 should
have already been allocated during the preprocessing steps, a contradiction. So, there is only one
good of type Sx and, similarly, only one good of type T y. Moreover, we must have 1, 2 ∈ S ∪ T
since, again, both agents 1 and 2 desire an even number of goods. If we set G1 = {Sx, T y} and
G2 = {{1, 2}xy}, then G1 and G2 should have already been allocated during the preprocessing
steps, a contradiction.
• Case 4: Good {1, 2, 3}xy is absent, and exactly two goods Sxy with |S| = 2 are present. Without
loss of generality, assume that these are {1, 2}xy and {1, 3}xy. By the preprocessing steps, goods
{1, 2}x, {1, 2}y, {1, 3}x, and {1, 3}y must be absent. Since every agent desires an even number
of goods, there is an even number (zero or two) goods of type Sx and an even number of goods of
type Sy.
– Case 4.1: There is no good of type Sx or no good of type Sy. Let us assume the former;
the latter case can be handled analogously. Then, the goods of type Sy must be {2}y and
{3}y, so that every agent in A desires two goods. If we set G1 = {{1, 2}xy, {3}y} and
G2 = {{1, 3}xy, {2}y}, then G1 and G2 should have already been allocated during the
preprocessing steps, a contradiction.
– Case 4.2: There are two goods of type Sx and two goods of type Sy. If {2, 3}x is present,
then goods {2}x and {3}x must be absent by the preprocessing steps. However, this means
that good {1}x must be present (so that there are two goods of type Sx), but there is no
way we can pick two goods of type Sy so that all agents desire an even number of goods.
Hence, good {2, 3}x must be absent and, similarly, {2, 3}y must also be absent. Therefore,
we must have goods {1}x, {1}y, Sx, and T y, where S, T ∈ {{2}, {3}} and S 6= T . If we set
G1 = {{1}x, {1}y, Sx, T y} and G2 = {{1, 2}xy, {1, 3}xy}, then G1 and G2 should have
already been allocated during the preprocessing steps, a contradiction.
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• Case 5: Good {1, 2, 3}xy is absent, and all three goods Sxy with |S| = 2 are present. By the
preprocessing steps, goods {1, 2}x, {1, 2}y, {1, 3}x, {1, 3}y, {2, 3}x, and {2, 3}y must be ab-
sent. Since every agent desires an even number of goods, there is an odd number (one or three)
goods of type Sx and an odd number of goods of type Sy. The only possibility that makes
each agent of group A desire an even number of goods is that there are three goods of each type:
{1}x, {2}x, {3}x and {1}y, {2}y, {3}y. If we setG1 = {{1}x, {2}x, {3}x, {1}y, {2}y, {3}y} and
G2 = {{1, 2}xy, {1, 3}xy, {2, 3}xy}, then G1 and G2 should have already been allocated during
the preprocessing steps, a contradiction.
All cases have been exhausted, and the proof is complete.
The following results complete the characterization for EF1 (and EFX) by proving that existence is
not guaranteed for larger sets.
Proposition 3.3. For (n1, n2) = (6, 1) and binary valuations, an EF1 allocation does not always exist.
Proof. Suppose that there are four goods. For each pair of goods, there is an agent in the first group who
desires both of the goods in the pair but does not desire the remaining two goods. On the other hand, the
singleton agent in the second group desires all goods. To guarantee EF1, this agent must receive at least
two goods, leaving at most two goods for the first group. However, this leaves some agent in the first
group with utility 0, and such an agent does not find the allocation to be EF1.
Proposition 3.4. For (n1, n2) = (4, 2) and binary valuations, an EF1 allocation does not always exist.
Proof. Suppose that there are four goods. The utilities in the first group are given by u11 = (1, 0, 1, 0),
u12 = (1, 0, 0, 1), u13 = (0, 1, 1, 0), and u14 = (0, 1, 0, 1), and the utilities in the second group by
u21 = (1, 1, 0, 0) and u22 = (0, 0, 1, 1). In an EF1 allocation, every agent needs at least one desired
good. In particular, the second group needs one of the first two goods and one of the last two goods.
However, any choice of these goods leaves some agent in the first group with utility 0, meaning that no
allocation in EF1.
In the next proposition, we give a general example for EFc since this will be useful later on.
Proposition 3.5. Let c be a positive integer. For (n1, n2) =
((
2c+1
c+1
)
,
(
2c+1
c+1
))
and binary valuations, an
EFc allocation does not always exist.
Proof. Suppose that there are 2c + 1 goods. For each subset of c + 1 goods, there is exactly one agent
in each group who desires the goods in this subset and nothing else. Every agent must get at least one
desired good in an EFc allocation. However, in any allocation one of the groups receives at most c
goods. In that group, at least one of the agents does not get any desired good. Hence no allocation can
be EFc.
Taking c = 1 in Proposition 3.5 yields the following:
Corollary 3.6. For (n1, n2) = (3, 3) and binary valuations, an EF1 allocation does not always exist.
Before addressing EFX0, we show that for two groups of arbitrary sizes, determining whether an
EF1 (and EFX) allocation exists is computationally hard. Our reduction is similar to the one used by
Segal-Halevi and Suksompong [2018] to show the hardness of deciding the existence of an allocation
that gives every agent a positive utility.
Proposition 3.7. For two groups of agents with binary valuations, it is NP-complete to decide whether
there exists an EF1 allocation.
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Proof. The problem is in NP, since we can clearly verify in polynomial time whether an allocation is
EF1 for every agent. To show hardness, we use a reduction from the MONOTONE 3-SAT problem,
which asks whether a Boolean formula consisting of clauses with either three positive or three negative
literals can be satisfied. In fact, we will use the slightly stronger version where the three literals in each
clause are distinct; this version is still NP-complete [Li, 1997].
Given an instance of MONOTONE 3-SAT consisting of a formula φ, we construct an instance of our
problem with two groups of agents A1 and A2 as follows:
• For each variable, there is a corresponding good.
• For each clause with three positive literals, we create an agent in A1 who desires exactly the three
goods corresponding to the variables contained in the clause.
• For each clause with three negative literals, we create an agent in A2 who desires exactly the three
goods corresponding to the variables contained in the clause.
Note that every agent needs at least one desired good in order to be EF1. Any assignment that
satisfies φ defines an allocation where the goods corresponding to true variables are allocated to group
A1, while those corresponding to false variables are allocated to groupA2. Since all clauses are satisfied,
every agent receives utility at least 1 and is therefore EF1. Similarly, any EF1 allocation gives rise to a
satisfying assignment for φ, completing the reduction.
We now turn to the stronger notion of EFX0, and show a negative result.
Proposition 3.8. For (n1, n2) = (2, 1) and binary valuations, an EFX0 allocation does not always exist.
Proof. Suppose that there are six goods. The utilities are given by u11 = (1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0), u12 =
(0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1), and u21 = (1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1). To guarantee EFX0, the singleton agent in the second group
must receive at least three goods, leaving at most three goods for the first group. This means that at least
one of the agents in the first group, say a11, receives at most one desired good. If a11 does not receive
any desired good, the allocation is clearly not EFX0 for her. Else, she receives exactly one desired good.
In this case, she has utility 2 for the second group’s bundle, and at least one of the goods in that bundle
yields utility 0 to her. Therefore the allocation cannot be EFX0.
In contrast, Plaut and Roughgarden [2018] showed that an EFX0 allocation always exists if (n1, n2) =
(1, 1), even for arbitrary monotonic valuations. Combined with Proposition 3.8, this yields a complete
characterization of EFX0 for every class of valuations between binary and monotonic.
4 Fixed Groups with General Valuations
In this section, we again assume that the partition of the agents into two groups is predetermined, but
allow them to have more general valuations.
We first show that the existence of EF1 allocations is guaranteed for (n1, n2) = (2, 1). The proof
relies on the following lemma which may be of independent interest. A partition of the goods in G into
two bundles is said to be exact up to one good (Exact1) for an agent if the agent views each bundle to be
EF1. As with allocations, we call a partition of the goods balanced if the sizes of the two bundles differ
by at most one.
Lemma 4.1. For two agents with responsive valuations, there always exists a balanced partition of G
into two bundles that is Exact1 for both agents.
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Proof. Suppose first that the number of goods m is even, say m = 2t. Assume without loss of
generality that the valuation u1 of the first agent is such that u1(g1) ≥ u1(g2) ≥ · · · ≥ u1(g2t).
Construct an undirected graph H with 2t vertices corresponding to the goods, and add t red edges
(g1, g2), (g3, g4), . . . , (g2t−1, g2t). Similarly, add t blue edges according to the valuation u2 of the sec-
ond agent. Since no two edges of the same color are adjacent, the graph cannot contain an odd cycle,
which means that H is bipartite. Therefore, its vertices can be partitioned into disjoint independent sets
V1 and V2. If |V1| ≥ t + 1, there is an edge among the vertices in V1, a contradiction. An analogous
statement holds for V2. It follows that |V1| = |V2| = t.
The partition (V1, V2) is balanced; it remains to show that it is Exact1 for both agents. By symmetry,
it suffices to prove this for the first agent. By construction, each of V1 and V2 contains exactly one good
from each of the pairs (g1, g2), (g3, g4), . . . , (g2t−1, g2t). For i = 1, 2, . . . , t− 1, the ith best good in V1
according to the first agent’s valuation is no worse than the (i + 1)st best good in V2. Responsiveness
then implies that the agent values V1 at least as much as V2 when the best good in V2 is removed. This
means that she regards V1 to be EF1. Similarly, she regards V2 to be EF1; hence the partition is Exact1
for her.
Suppose now that m = 2t− 1 is odd. We add a dummy good g2t such that ui(G′ ∪{g2t}) = ui(G′)
for i = 1, 2 and any G′ ⊆ G. We then repeat the same procedure as in the case where m is even (placing
g2t at the end of each agent’s ranking of single goods), and remove g2t from the resulting partition. The
final partition is balanced, and a similar proof as before shows that it is Exact1 for both agents.
Note that the lemma no longer holds if we move to three agents (while still keeping the partition into
two bundles), even for binary valuations. Indeed, if there are three goods and each of the three agents
desires a distinct subset of two goods, then no partition is Exact1 for all three agents.
Lemma 4.1 yields the following EF1 existence result.
Theorem 4.2. For (n1, n2) = (2, 1) and responsive valuations, a balanced EF1 allocation always
exists.
Proof. Choose two arbitrary agents and consider a balanced partition of G into two bundles that is
Exact1 for both agents; such a partition exists by Lemma 4.1. Let the remaining agent choose for her
group the bundle that she prefers, and allocate the other bundle to the other group. It is clear that the
resulting allocation is balanced and EF1.
In light of Theorem 4.2 and our characterization for binary valuations in Section 3, it is natural to ask
whether EF1 can also be guaranteed for larger groups with additive valuations and beyond. While we
were unable to settle this question, we show that the existence of EF1 allocations would be guaranteed
for almost all of the remaining cases provided that a graph-theoretic conjecture of Jafari and Alipour
[2017] is true. To describe the conjecture and its implications in our setting, we need to introduce a class
of graphs called generalized Kneser graphs.2
Definition 4.3. Let b ≥ r ≥ s be positive integers and consider an underlying set of elements U such
that |U| = b. The generalized Kneser graph K(b, r, s) is an undirected graph with all r-element subsets
of U as its vertices. Two vertices are connected by an edge if and only if the corresponding subsets
intersect in at most s− 1 elements.
Recall that the chromatic number of a graph H , denoted by χ(H), is the minimum number of colors
needed to color the vertices of H so that any two adjacent vertices have different colors. For example,
K(4, 2, 2) is a clique of size 6, so its chromatic number is 6.
We are now ready to establish the connection between the generalized Kneser graph and our fair
division problem.
2Kneser graphs have previously been used in the context of fair division and resource allocation by Suksompong [2016]
and Plaut and Roughgarden [2018].
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Theorem 4.4. Let z := minr≥2 χ(K(2r, r, 2)). For two groups with at most z − 1 agents in total and
arbitrary monotonic valuations, a balanced EF1 allocation always exists.
Proof. Suppose first that the number of goods m is even, say m = 2t. If t = 1, any allocation that
gives one good to each group is balanced and EF1, so we may assume that t ≥ 2. Consider the graph
K(2t, t, 2) with the vertices corresponding to all balanced allocations, where we identify each vertex by
the set of goods allocated to the first group.
Give each agent a distinct color, and let her color all allocations that she does not regard as EF1. We
claim that no agent can color two adjacent vertices. Consider an agent in the first group with valuation u,
and suppose for contradiction that she colors two adjacent vertices corresponding to the sets G1 and G2.
Since the two vertices are adjacent, |G1 ∩G2| ≤ 1. If G1 ∩G2 = ∅, since |G1| = |G2| = t it holds that
G2 = G\G1. So the agent should consider one of the two allocations as EF, which is a contradiction to
her coloring both vertices. Therefore |G1 ∩ G2| = 1. Let g be the common good of G1 and G2. Since
the agent does not view G1 to be EF1, we have u(G1) < u(G2\{g}) = u((G\G1)\{g′}), where g′ is
the unique good that does not belong to G1∪G2. Similarly, since the agent does not view G2 to be EF1,
we have u(G2) < u(G1\{g}). Monotonicity then implies that
u(G1) < u(G2\{g}) ≤ u(G2) < u(G1\{g}) ≤ u(G1),
a contradiction. The claim can be proven similarly for agents in the second group by observing that for
any two balanced allocations, the bundles allocated to the first group intersect in at most one good if and
only if the same condition holds for the bundles allocated to the second group.
Since there are at most z − 1 agents, the number of colors is at most z − 1 ≤ χ(K(2t, t, 2)) − 1.
Hence there is a vertex that does not receive any color. By definition, this vertex corresponds to a
balanced allocation that is EF1 for all agents. This completes the proof for the case where m is even.
Suppose now thatm = 2t−1 is odd. We add a dummy good g2t such that uij(G′∪{g2t}) = uij(G′)
for all agents aij and all G′ ⊆ G. We then repeat the same procedure as in the case where m is even and
remove g2t from the resulting allocation. The final allocation is balanced, and a similar proof as before
shows that it is EF1.
Jafari and Alipour [2017] proved that K(2r, r, 2) ≤ 6 for all r ≥ 2, and conjectured that this bound
is in fact always tight.
Conjecture 4.5 ([Jafari and Alipour, 2017]). For any r ≥ 2, we have χ(K(2r, r, 2)) = 6.
If Conjecture 4.5 is true, then together with Theorem 4.4, it would imply that a balanced EF1 al-
location is guaranteed to exist for two groups with at most 5 agents in total and arbitrary monotonic
valuations.3 The bound of 5 cannot be improved to 6 due to Corollary 3.6. Moreover, this result would
answer the EF1 existence question in the affirmative for all of the remaining group sizes except for
the case (5, 1). We remark that for this case, a balanced EF1 allocation might not exist, even when
valuations are binary.
Proposition 4.6. For (n1, n2) = (5, 1) and binary valuations, a balanced EF1 allocation does not
always exist.
Proof. Suppose that there are four goods. The utilities in the first group are given by u11 = (1, 1, 0, 0),
u12 = (1, 0, 1, 0), u13 = (1, 0, 0, 1), u14 = (0, 1, 1, 0), u15 = (0, 1, 0, 1), and in the second group
3Jafari and Alipour [2017] also claimed that χ(K(2r, r, 2)) ≥ 4 for all r ≥ 2. In combination with our Theorem 4.4,
this would imply that our Theorem 4.2 can be generalized to arbitrary monotonic valuations. However, the proof of their
Theorem 5.1 contains an error when they claim that the intersection of the two k-subsets of color j has at most i− 1 elements.
It is only true that the intersection has at most i − 1 elements in each of the two hemispheres, and therefore at most 2i − 2
elements in total. It is not clear whether the proof can be recovered in light of this error.
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by u21 = (1, 1, 0, 0). The only balanced allocation that is EF1 for all agents in the first group is the
allocation that gives the first two goods to the first group. However, this allocation is not EF1 for the
singleton agent, so no balanced allocation is EF1.4
We note that our techniques in Theorem 4.4 can be extended to weaker relaxations of envy-freeness.
For any positive integer c, it is known that an EFc allocation is guaranteed to exist for two groups with
at most c + 1 agents in total and additive valuations [Segal-Halevi and Suksompong, 2018]. On the
other hand, letting zc := minr≥c+1 χ(K(2r, r, c + 1)), a similar proof as in Theorem 4.4 shows that
an EFc allocation can always be found when the two groups contain at most zc − 1 agents in total with
arbitrary monotonic valuations. Jafari and Alipour [2017] proved that χ(K(2r, r, c + 1)) ≤ (2c+2c+1 )
for all r ≥ c + 1. If this inequality becomes equality for all r (in which case we would have zc =(
2c+2
c+1
)
), it would imply an exponential improvement in the relation between the number of agents and
the number of goods in the EFc approximation. The bound zc−1 would also be tight due to the instance
in Proposition 3.5.
We conclude this section by showing that existence can no longer be guaranteed if we strengthen
the fairness requirement from EF1 to EFX. Recall that for binary valuations, an EFX allocation always
exists when one group contains at most five agents and the other group is a singleton. We show that this
is not the case for additive valuations, even when the first group contains only two agents.
Proposition 4.7. For (n1, n2) = (2, 1) and additive valuations, an EFX allocation does not always
exist.
Proof. Suppose that there are four goods. The utilities are given by u11 = (3, 1, 1, 1), u12 = (1, 3, 1, 1),
and u21 = (3, 3, 1, 1). In an EFX allocation, the singleton agent in the second group needs either both
of the first two goods, or one of the first two and at least one of the last two goods. The former option
leaves both agents in the first group unsatisfied. For the latter option, assume without loss of generality
that the singleton agent receives g1 and g3. Then the resulting allocation is not EFX for a11. Hence there
is no EFX allocation in this instance.
Since an EFX allocation always exists when (n1, n2) = (1, 1) for arbitrary monotonic valuations
[Plaut and Roughgarden, 2018], we have a complete characterization of EFX for every class of valuations
between additive and monotonic.
5 Variable Groups
Thus far, we have worked under the assumption that the partition of agents into groups is determined
in advance. This assumption is appropriate when we consider, for example, membership in a family or
citizenship of a country. In other settings, however, the choice of the group to which the agents belong
can be made by a central authority or by the agents themselves. This applies to membership in a library,
gym, or other facilities.
With this motivation in mind, we depart from the framework of fixed groups in this section, and
instead assume that the partition of the agents into groups can be chosen along with the allocation of
the goods. Under this assumption, finding an EF1, EFX, or even envy-free allocation is trivial: simply
put all agents in one group and allocate all goods to that group. However, this may lead to undesirable
situations where a gym is overcrowded or a library does not have enough space to hold all of its books.
As we will show, it is nevertheless possible to obtain a fair outcome that is moreover balanced with
respect to both the agents and the goods, for any number of agents with general valuations.
4This instance does, however, admit an EF1 allocation. For example, the allocation that gives only the first good to the
singleton agent is EF1.
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5.1 Two Groups
We start with two groups and show that EF1 can be guaranteed for any desired sizes of these groups. Our
algorithm generalizes the discrete “cut-and-choose” algorithm for allocating indivisible goods between
two individual agents [Bilo` et al., 2019; Oh et al., 2019].
Theorem 5.1. Let n be any positive integer. Suppose that there are n agents with arbitrary monotonic
valuations, and let n1 and n2 be non-negative integers with n1+n2 = n. There always exists a partition
of the agents into two groups such that group i ∈ {1, 2} contains ni agents, along with an EF1 allocation
of the goods to the two groups.
Proof. Arrange the goods in a line. Starting with an empty bundle, we add one good at a time from the
left until at least n1 agents find the bundle to be EF1. If this condition is met before we add any good, we
give n1 of these agents an empty bundle and the remaining n2 agents the entire setG. Otherwise, denote
by g the last good added to the bundle. We assign to the first group all agents who view the bundle as
EF1 before the addition of g, along with an arbitrary subset of those who find it EF1 after g is added so
that the first group has size n1. We allocate this bundle to the first group, and the remaining goods to the
second group, which consists of the remaining agents.
Since the entire set G is EF1 for all agents, the process terminates. By construction, the agents in
the first group regard the allocation as EF1, so we only need to show that the same holds for the second
group. This is trivial if the second group receives the entire set G. Otherwise, let GL and GR be the
bundles to the left and right of g, respectively (not containing g). Every agent in the second group does
not find GL to be EF1, which means that she has more value for GR than GL. This implies that the
agent finds GR to be EF1, as desired.
For the case where a balanced allocation of the goods is required, we prove that this can also be
achieved and, in fact, it can always be combined with a balanced partition of the agents. This means that
in our gym and library applications, it is possible to reach a balance in terms of the users as well as the
resources.
Theorem 5.2. Let n be any positive integer, and suppose that there are n agents with arbitrary mono-
tonic valuations. There always exists a balanced partition of the agents into two groups along with a
balanced EF1 allocation of the goods to the two groups.
Proof. Suppose first that both the number of agents n and the number of goods m are even, say n =
2s and m = 2t. Assume for contradiction that there is no balanced partition along with a balanced
allocation.
Arrange the goods around a circle with equal spacing between adjacent goods. Imagine a knife
that cuts through the center of the circle, dividing the goods into two bundles G1 and G2, each of
size t. By our assumption, any balanced assignment of the agents to G1 and G2 does not result in an
EF1 allocation. On the other hand, there does exist an assignment such that the resulting allocation is
EF1 (e.g., an assignment that gives every agent her favorite bundle). Consider such an assignment that
moreover minimizes the difference between the numbers of agents in the two groups. Assume without
loss of generality that more than half of the agents are assigned to G1. If one of these agents finds G2
to be EF1, we can reassign her to G2 and reduce the discrepancy between the two groups. Hence all of
these agents do not find G2 to be EF1.
Next, we rotate the knife clockwise by one position, thereby moving a good g from G1 to G2
and another good g from G2 to G1. Call the resulting bundles H1 = (G1 ∪ {g})\{g} and H2 =
(G2∪{g})\{g}, respectively. We claim that the agents who do not find G2 to be EF1 regard H1 as EF1.
Denoting the valuation of an arbitrary such agent by u, we have
u(H1) ≥ u(G1\{g})
> u(G2) ≥ u(G2\{g}) = u(H2\{g}),
14
where the first and third inequalities follow from monotonicity. So the agent indeed finds H1 to be EF1.
Since more than half of the agents do not find G2 to be EF1, more than half of the agents regard H1 as
EF1. By our assumption, any balanced assignment of the agents to H1 and H2 does not result in an EF1
allocation. It follows that in any assignment such that the resulting allocation is EF1, more than half of
the agents are assigned to H1. Additionally, more than half of the agents do not find H2 to be EF1.
If we rotate the knife clockwise repeatedly, the same argument tells us that more than half of the
agents do not find the second bundle (i.e., G2, H2, and so on) to be EF1. After t rotation steps, the knife
has rotated halfway around the circle, and the second bundle coincides with the original first bundle G1.
However, we know from earlier that more than half of the agents find G1 to be EF1. This yields the
desired contradiction.
Suppose now that n is odd orm is odd (or both). If n is odd, we add a dummy agent with an arbitrary
monotonic valuation. If m is odd, we add a dummy good that always yields zero marginal utility for
every agent. We then repeat the same procedure as in the case where m and n are even, and remove the
dummy agent and/or the dummy good. The resulting partition and allocation are both balanced, and a
similar proof as before shows that the allocation is EF1.
Theorem 5.2 yields the following result on individual fair division, which is new to the best of our
knowledge.
Corollary 5.3. For two individual agents with arbitrary monotonic valuations, there always exists a
balanced EF1 allocation.
When valuations are responsive, a balanced EF1 allocation (for arbitrarily many agents) can also
be obtained by the round-robin algorithm, which lets the agents take turns choosing their favorite good
from the remaining goods until all goods are taken (see, e.g., [Caragiannis et al., 2016]). However, the
round-robin algorithm does not work for arbitrary monotonic valuations.
Turning our attention to EFX, we show that if we require the partition of the agents to be balanced, an
EFX allocation might not exist; this complements Theorems 5.1 and 5.2 above. In addition, a balanced
EFX allocation does not necessarily exist for two individual agents even when the agents have identical
additive valuations, which complements Corollary 5.3.
Proposition 5.4. There does not always exist a balanced partition of the agents into two groups along
with an EFX allocation of the goods to the two groups, even when valuations are additive.
Proof. Suppose that there are six agents and three goods. The utilities of the agents are given by u1 =
u2 = (3, 1, 1), u3 = u4 = (1, 3, 1), and u5 = u6 = (1, 1, 3). If the allocation places all three goods in
one bundle, all agents must be assigned to that bundle for the allocation to be EFX. Else, the allocation
places two goods in one bundle and one good in the other bundle. In this case, at most two agents can
be assigned to the second bundle in an EFX allocation, so the partition of agents would not be balanced.
Hence there is no balanced partition of agents if the allocation must be EFX.
Proposition 5.5. Let m be a positive integer. There exists an instance with two individual agents who
have identical additive valuations and m goods, such that in any EFX allocation, one of the agents
receives exactly one good.
Proof. Consider two agents with the same additive valuation u(g1) = m and u(gi) = 1 for i =
2, 3, . . . ,m. Assume without loss of generality that the first agent receives g1. If the first agent also
receives another good gi, then the second agent’s value for the first agent’s bundle when gi is removed
is at least m. On the other hand, the second agent’s value for her own bundle is at most m − 2. Hence
the first agent cannot receive another good besides g1.
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5.2 Any Number of Groups
We now consider any number of groups and show how Theorem 5.1 can be partially extended to this
setting. While we do not know whether EF1 or other relaxations of envy-freeness can be achieved in
this general setting, we show that we can obtain a positive result for a weaker fairness notion called
proportionality. An allocation of the goods in G to k groups is said to be proportional if every agent
receives value at least 1/k of her value for the whole set G. As with envy-freeness, a proportional
allocation does not always exist (e.g., when there are two individual agents and one valuable good), so it
is necessary to consider a relaxation. Let uj,max := maxmt=1 uj(gt) denote the maximum value of agent
aj for a single good.
Theorem 5.6. Let n and k be any positive integers. Suppose that there are n agents with additive
valuations, and let n1, . . . , nk be non-negative integers with
∑k
i=1 ni = n. There always exists a
partition of the agents into k groups such that group i contains ni agents, along with an allocation of
the goods to the k groups such that each agent aj receives utility at least 1k · uj(G)− k−1k · uj,max.
Proof. Letwj := 1k ·uj(G)− k−1k ·uj,max. Arrange the goods in a line and process them from left to right.
Suppose that we have already formed i− 1 groups. Starting with an empty bundle, we add one good at
a time from the left until at least ni agents aj receive utility at least wj . If this condition is met before
we add any good, assign ni of these agents to the ith group, give them an empty bundle, and remove
them from consideration. Otherwise, denote by g the last good added to the bundle. Assign to the ith
group all agents who already have enough utility before g is added, along with an arbitrary subset of
those who have enough utility after g is added so that the group has size ni. Allocate the current bundle
to the group, and remove the agents and goods involved from consideration. After we have formed k−1
groups, simply assign the remaining agents to the kth group and give them the leftover goods.
Consider any agent aj . It suffices to show that if at most k − 1 groups have been formed, the agent
still has utility at least wj for the remaining goods. The statement holds trivially if wj ≤ 0, so we may
assume that wj > 0. If a group takes an empty bundle, aj loses utility 0. Else, denote by g the last good
added to the bundle that a group takes. The agent aj has utility less than wj for the bundle before g is
added, so she has utility less than wj + uj,max for the bundle with g. Hence the bundles that have been
already allocated to groups are together worth at most (k−1)(wj+uj,max) = k−1k ·uj(G)+ k−1k ·uj,max to
aj . This means that aj has utility at least uj(G)−
(
k−1
k · uj(G) + k−1k · uj,max
)
= wj for the remaining
goods, as claimed.
Theorem 5.6 generalizes a result of Suksompong [2017], which holds for individual fair division
(i.e., ni = 1 for all i = 1, . . . , k). The factor k−1k in the approximation cannot be improved even in this
special case.
6 Discussion
In this paper, we examine the fairness guarantees that can be obtained in the allocation of indivisible
goods among groups of agents. For two fixed groups of agents, we provide a complete picture for EF1
and EFX when agents have binary valuations, and we present further positive and negative results for
more general valuations. We also introduce a new model where the partition of the agents into groups
can be determined along with the allocation of the goods, and show that it is possible to attain a balance
in both the agents and the goods simultaneously.
Our work leaves many open questions for future study. For two groups, one could try to establish
the existence of EF1 allocations for larger group sizes, either by settling the graph-theoretic conjecture
of Jafari and Alipour [2017] or via other means. In addition, the questions that we study in this paper
can also be asked for multiple groups; our techniques do not seem to extend easily to more than two
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groups in most cases. For individual fair division, we also leave the question of whether a balanced EF1
allocation can always be found for any number of agents; Corollary 5.3 gives a positive answer for the
case of two agents. While the round-robin algorithm works when valuations are responsive, the question
intriguingly remains open for arbitrary monotonic valuations.
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